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We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and 
a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when 
agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized 
control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the 
agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, 
our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater 
social complexity, while it increases with the bias of the countries’ authorities, openness, and 
transparency, consistently with the theory. 
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The success of any development assistance program depends, to a large extent, on recip-
ients’ preferences and priorities, which implies that how to implement reforms crucially
depends on the details of a country’s situation. In the debate on the reform of International
Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality it has often been argued that both conditionality and
ownership are central to assistance programs but it is far from obvious how they should
interact (Drazen, 2001). As long as ownership may be deﬁned as the extent to which a
country is interested in pursuing reforms independently of any incentives provided by the
IMF, ownership seems to negate the need for conditionality. Indeed, conditionality can
be justiﬁed by the existence of a conﬂict of interest between the lender and the borrower
about policy.
Conﬂicts of interest over desired policy may reﬂect various causes. Political economy
mechanisms, such as lobbying by special interest groups, may explain why some govern-
ments may choose to follow policies deviating from the ﬁrst-best (e.g., Svensson, 2000;
Mayer and Mourmouras, 2002, 2008), where this is especially true in programs with a
structural orientation (Mussa and Savastano, 1999).1 On that respect, the true value of a
multilateral institution would lie in its ability to use its independence from local interests
to improve policies (Rajan, 2008).2
This diﬀerence in objectives and the existence of informational asymmetries between
the lender and the borrower justiﬁes the use of a principal-agent model to represent
the relationship that the Fund (the principal) establishes with the recipient government
1The empirical evidence indicates that the implementation of structural conditionality is inferior to
macroeconomic conditionality, especially in countries with strong interests groups (e.g., Ivanova et al.,
2003 and Nsouli et al., 2005). Vreeland (2006) provides a comprehensive overview.
2It is worth noting that the government can alternatively be seen as a unitary actor subject to some
pressures by special interest groups or it must contend with domestic veto players (e.g., Drazen, 2001).
The latter are constitutional and institutional actors inﬂuencing policy making from within the govern-
ment.
3(the agent). In this paper we aim to interpret the notion of ownership and the way in
which conditionality and ownership can be made mutually consistent. More speciﬁcally,
we try to reconcile these two terms by looking at ownership and conditionality as two
distinct and alternative incentive schemes that should induce the recipient government
to act optimally. In other words, we want to emphasize an incentive-based rationale for
ownership.3 In order to do this, we should adopt a narrower deﬁnition of both ownership
and conditionality.
The term "conditionality" has traditionally encompassed two categories: the policy
actions a member country needs to take to continue the arrangement and the economic
outcomes which the country is required to achieve (Mussa and Savastano, 1999). The
concept of “ownership,” instead, suggests to distinguish the case in which conditionality
strictly speciﬁe st h ep o l i c ya c t i o n sf r o mt h ec a s ei nw h i c ho w n e r s h i po fap r o g r a mb yt h e
borrowing country would leave the country considerable freedom to devise its own details
of actions, to be ultimately judged by their outcomes. Ownership would then represent a
situation in which control rights over policies are allocated to the borrowing government
(delegation). To the contrary, conventional conditionality, which speciﬁes the speciﬁc
actions needed to be implemented for program continuation, represents the case in which
control rights are allocated to the IMF (centralization).
In the principal-agent literature, the choice between basing the incentives on the
actions or the outcomes depends on the degrees of accuracy with which the diﬀerent
actions and outcomes can be monitored (e.g., Dixit, 2000). If outcomes are fully (and
timely) observable, it would be optimal to choose an incentive scheme based on outcomes,
thus leaving the agent free to devise how to achieve the objectives (ownership). Conversely,
if outcomes are not observable (or observable only with large errors or delays), while
actions can be monitored with more precision, agents have to be monitored for their
3For a similar approach see Ivanova (2006).
4actions. This will be the case for conventional conditionality.
In the agency relationship established between the Fund and the recipient country,
however, there is poor observability of both actions and outcomes: governments’ actions
are imperfectly observable; outcomes are not fully determined by actions but are also
aﬀected by luck, and, moreover, governments’ competence cannot be readily distinguished
ex ante (Drazen and Fischer, 1997). Under these circumstances, whether action-based,
outcome-based (or mixed), all incentive schemes are imperfect in the sense that they
cannot achieve a ﬁrst-best solution.4
The key insight of our model is that the choice among these two alternative incentive
schemes should address the problem of enhancing communication between the IMF and
the recipient countries. This issue has so far been neglected in the literature, while we
believe that information transmission is crucial in clarifying the importance of ownership
in the debate on the reform of conditionality and, more generally in reforms design and
implementation. For this reason, in this paper we focus on the eﬀects of the two dif-
ferent incentive schemes (ownership vs. conditionality) in fostering communication (i.e.,
transmission of private information) between the IMF and the borrowing country.
In order to be able to screen among a range of programs the one which is best
tailored to the type of recipient government, the Fund needs to have some country-speciﬁc
information which is privately owned by the government (i.e., its local knowledge). In
preparing the loan arrangement, IMF oﬃc i a l sm u s tt h u sp e r s u a d et h eg o v e r n m e n tt o
s h a r es o m ec o n ﬁdential data on both economic and sociopolitical issues and to enter
into detailed negotiations on a wide range of areas.5 However, whenever the Fund and
4Furthermore, in the context of IMF adjustment programs, even the distinction between policy actions
and outcomes gets often blurred. Indeed, sometimes the IMF can be directly concerned about the means
as well as the ends; then the actions logically fall into the outcomes category (Dixit, 2000). For example,
a given improvement in the government’s budget balance can be achieved in various ways: by reducing
public expenditure (transfers, government consumption, public investment), by raising taxes or by asset
sales.
5For example, during the East Asian crisis, the Thai authorities refused to share their conﬁdential
5the recipient government’s objectives diﬀer, the IMF will expect the recipient country to
transmit its information distorted by a ”bias” and it will try to correct the information
transmitted by the government for such a bias. If the country’s authorities are not naive,
they will anticipate this and they will use communication strategically (Crawford and
Sobel, 1982). Thus, agency problems have indirect negative eﬀects on communication
(i.e., transmission of private information between the IMF and the borrowing country) and
strategic behavior by the agent (the borrowing government) prevents full communication
of private information to the decision maker (the Fund).
In our model, the issue of delegation (ownership) versus centralization (conventional
conditionality) is enriched by the (new) feature that the principal (the IMF) owns some
private information as well. Mutual communication is important because the IMF owns
skills and information (i.e., its analytical and cross-country knowledge) which are useful
to process the country’s local information. Thus, the analytical setting of the agency rela-
tionship between the IMF and the borrowing governments is one of two-sided incomplete
information.
The main result of our model is that whenever agency problems are especially severe,
and/or IMF private information is relatively more valuable than local knowledge, a cen-
tralized control may be optimal. In this case we would expect no delegation (conventional
conditionality). To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency
bias (for example if a country has a particularly complex socio-economic structure but a
sound institutional capacity) we would expect delegation (ownership) to be the optimal
incentive scheme.
An immediate empirical implication of the model would be to empirically investigate
the "scope" (i.e. the degree of "intrusiveness") of conditionality in relation to information
transmission problems. In this context, a "narrower" conditionality could be considered as
data on the banks showing the extent of nonperforming loans (see Blustein, 2003).
6ap r o x yf o rag r e a t e rd e g r e eo fo w n e r s h i p .W ew i l ld e ﬁne conditionality to be "narrower"
when the number of program conditions are relatively small.
More speciﬁcally, we investigate the determinants of the number of conditions in IMF
programs over the period 1992-2005. Our sample comprises a maximum of 281 programs
from 97 countries, depending on the control variables we include. Controlling for economic
and political factors, we ﬁnd that the number of IMF conditions declines with countries’
social complexity and increases with the bias of the countries’ authorities. It is higher
in more open and more transparent countries. Our empirical evidence is thus consistent
with the main prediction of the theory.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is developed in Section 2. Section 3
discusses the equilibrium in the conditionality and the ownership case, while Section 4
analyzes the optimal allocation of control rights by comparing the comparative statics of
ownership and conditionality. Section 5 describes the empirical model while the results are
presented in Section 6. Section 7 presents a test for robustness, while Section 8 concludes
the paper.
1.1 Related Literature
In the literature on strategic information transmission, built on the seminal paper by
Crawford and Sobel (1982), it is claimed that an (uninformed) principal may rationally
decide to grant formal decision rights (i.e., delegate) to an agent who is better informed
but has diﬀerent objectives.
Speciﬁcally, Dessein (2002), studying the optimal allocation of decision making au-
thority between a principal and an agent inside a ﬁrm, shows that, to the extent that
a principal cannot verify the claims of a better informed agent, he is in general better
oﬀ delegating decision rights to the agent, in order to avoid the noisy communication
7and hence the associated loss of information. In his model, in the trade-oﬀ between the
loss of control under delegation, and the loss of information under communication (i.e.,
centralization), delegation always dominates centralization unless the agency bias is so
large to make communication uninformative.6 This means that whenever the decision is
centralized there won’t be any informative communication between the principal and the
agent, and the principal will decide without any participation of the agent.
Harris and Raviv (2005, 2008) build on Dessein (2002) but assume that both the
principal and the agent own some private information relevant for the decision. This
assumption allows the authors to derive quite diﬀerent results. Speciﬁcally, they show
that even under centralization the agent plays a role by communicating some of her
private information to the principal. Thus, they provide a rationale for centralization also
in terms of information transmission.
Our paper’s contribution is twofold. First, we analyze theoretically the transmission
of information in the design of IMF-supported programs. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the
eﬀects of conditionality versus ownership in fostering communication. Although there is
a large agency literature in corporate ﬁnance dealing with communication issues, it is the
ﬁrst time that such issues are studied in the context of conditional programs.
Our theoretical model builds on Harris and Raviv (2005) insomuch as it considers the
existence of a two-sided incomplete information agency relationship between the Fund and
the borrowing government. It follows that the main theoretical results are similar to those
derived by Harris and Raviv although applied to a diﬀerent context. In particular, we ﬁnd
that, despite the agency problems, it is sometimes optimal to delegate the choice of the
adjustment program to the recipient country. Speciﬁcally, for each given bias, delegation
6Aghion and Tirole (1997) modelled an incentive based rationale for delegation, too. However, while
their focus is on the impact of authority on the information structure, Dessein (2002), and this paper as
well, takes the information structure as given and investigate how the allocation of authority improves
the use of private information.
8(ownership) is preferred by the Fund when its informational advantage is smaller than
the country’s. However, even when centralization (conventional conditionality) will be the
optimal choice, the recipient country still plays some non-trivial role by communicating
some of his local knowledge to the Fund.7
The idea that conditionality should take into account the domestic political realities
in countries making use of its resources is not new. Dixit (2008), Easterly (2008) and
Rajan (2008) claim that how to design viable reforms crucially depends on the political
details of a country’s situation. According to Dixit (2008), case studies and theory give
some general principles which should be combined with context-speciﬁck n o w l e d g et og e t
viable reforms. In turn, Rajan (2008) argues that not only should multilateral institutions
advise on what would be good in an ideal world, but they should also oﬀer second-best
solutions that utilize the knowledge of the authorities in that country in formulating fea-
sible reforms. Finally, Drazen (2001), Khan and Sharma (2001), Mayer and Mourmouras
(2008), Ivanova (2006) have analyzed “ownership” as applied to the speciﬁcc o n t e x to f
IMF conditionality. None of them, however, has addressed the problem of information
transmission between the Fund and the recipient countries. Our model thus represents a
ﬁrst attempt to formalize these issues by explicitly modelling the motivations to provide
low quality information in the context of a standard agency relationship.
Finally, we contribute to the literature in the empirical part as well. On the one
hand, to our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst time that the choice between centralization and
delegation is empirically tested. On the other hand, as conditionality is concerned, even
though the degree of "stringency" of conditionality has been investigated in a number of
previous studies (see, for example, Ivanova et al., 2003; Gould, 2003; Dreher and Jensen,
2007; and Stone, 2008), it is the ﬁr s tt i m et h a tv a r i a b l e sr e l a t e dt ot h et r a n s m i s s i o no f
information between the Fund and the borrowing country are included in the analysis.
7T h ea m o u n to ft i m ea n de ﬀort which is devoted to the negotiations between the borrowing country
and the Fund actually conﬁrms the complexity of the interaction between the two.
9We do believe the transmision of information is a crucial aspect which should be taken
into account more carefully in reforms design.
2 The model
The model is a three stage game between two agents: the IMF and a borrowing country’s
government. All agents are risk neutral. The IMF and a country’s government must take
a decision about an adjustment program denoted by s.
The borrowing country’s welfare is measured by Y (s) (i.e., a country’s national in-
come), which is a function of the adjustment program s. The adjustment program which
maximizes Y (s), denoted by s∗, is assumed to be determined by two stochastic factors e a
and e p. We also assume that the Fund and the borrowing government privately observe e p
and e a respectively, and that :
s
∗ = a + p (1)
thus (1) is determined by the sum of the two signals a and p, namely for a program to be
optimally designed, the two agents need to truthfully communicate. We interpret s∗ as
the number and/or the depth of the adjustment policies required to cover the output gap.
Y (s) is assumed to monotonically decrease with the distance between the adjustment
program s, which is actually implemented, and the program s∗. More speciﬁcally, we
assume: Y (s)=Yo− (s − s∗)2, where Yois potential output.
2.1 Information
The stochastic variable e a, whose support is in (0,A), is observed only by the govern-
ment. e a represents the local knowledge, including both information about the state of the
country’s economy and sociopolitical information about the preferences and the agenda
of the government and of the relevant national constituencies. Therefore, information on
10e a is important to measure what is called a country’s “institutional capacity” to perform
reforms (Drazen and Isard, 2004). The government’s superior information over e a can be
seen as deriving from its greater proximity to the “business environment,” relative to the
IMF oﬃcials. Such type of information is assumed to be soft, that is it cannot be certiﬁed
or “proved.”
The Fund privately observes the random variable e p, w h o s es u p p o r ti si n(0,P).I t s
informational advantage, relative to the government, derives from cross-country knowl-
edge it accumulates during its activities (surveillance, technical assistance, lending). Such
knowledge allows it to better understand the links between policies and economic out-
comes, building on the analysis of what has worked elsewhere. Moreover, through its
multilateral surveillance activity, the IMFi sa b l et ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h eg l o b a le c o -
nomic conditions in the choice of the recipient country’s adjustment program.
In order to determine the program which maximizes the recipient country’s output,
the IMF and the borrowing government need to combine their private knowledge. We
assume that the variables e a and e p are independent, with e a uniformly distributed on [0,A]
and e p uniformly distributed on [0,P].8 The larger is A, the larger the informational
advantage of the borrowing government over the IMF with respect to e a. Likewise, the
larger is P, the larger the informational advantage of the IMF over the government with
respect to e p.9
8Uniform distributions are assumed for analytical tractability.
9Harris and Raviv (2005) underline that increasing the importance of a player’s private information
in determining the ﬁrst-best program is analytically equivalent to increasing the player’s informational
advantage. Thus, if we assume s∗ to be a linear combination of a and p, e.g., s∗ = πa+∂p, all the results
obtained in the original speciﬁcation will hold by repacing A and P with πA and ∂P.
112.2 Objective functions
2.2.1 IMF
The IMF (the principal) is assumed to be a benevolent multilateral institution.10 It aims
at reducing economic policy distortions in the recipient country (the agent) by oﬀering
economic assistance contingent on the adoption of distortion-lowering policies. Such ob-
jective is strengthened and complemented by the desire to reduce the negative eﬀects of
domestic policies on global output, due to potential negative spillovers.11 Formally, the
program preferred by the maximizes the following objective function, that is:
Max
s U
IMF = Y (s)+γY
RW(s) (2)
where Y and Y RW measure the borrowing country and the Rest of the World output,
respectively. They both depend on the country’s adjustment program s.12 The parameter
γ (0 <γ<1) denotes the importance of spillover eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, if the recipient
country is big, γ will tend to 1, while for very small countries γ will be close to 0,d e n o t i n g
the absence of any adverse spillover eﬀect.
Let s∗
IMF denote the program which maximizes (2). We assume that the program
optimal for the IMF diﬀers from the program which maximizes a country’s national output
by a constant γe, which captures the relevance of spillover eﬀects. Formally:
s
∗
IMF = a + p + γe = s
∗ + γe
Note that when γ =0 , s∗
IMF = s∗.
10We do not consider the IMF’s concern for its private interests (bureaucratic bias, as in the public
choice literature (Vaubel, 1986)) nor for the interests of some “special” shareholders (political pressures).
11The rapid increase in trade and cross-border capital ﬂows in recent years has tied countries more
closely together. Moreover, greater economic integration implies that a greater policy dialogue among
countries will become necessary and multilateral institutions would be an ideal context for such a dialogue
to take place (Rajan, 2008).
12Here the policies in the rest of the world are taken as given, namely we do not consider strategic
interactions among countries.
12UIMF monotonically decrease with the distance between the adjustment program s,
which is actually implemented, and the IMF’s preferred program s∗












The borrowing government is concerned about its national income, but its choice is con-
strained by the inﬂuence of some interest groups, which may beneﬁt from structural
distortions (e.g., Drazen 2001).14 To formalize this argument, we assume that the gov-
ernment maximizes the following objective function:
Max
s U
G = Y (s)+θC(s) (4)
where C are contributions from special interests groups. We assume that C decreases
with s, that is with the number and/or the depth of the distortion lowering policies. The
parameter θ (0 <θ<1) denotes the importance of lobbies. Speciﬁcally, if lobbies are
very powerful θ will tend to 1, while if they are weak θ will be close to 0.L e ts∗
G denote
the adjustment program which is preferred by the government. We assume: s∗
G = s∗−θb.
By interpreting s∗ as the number and/or the depth of the adjustment policies required
to cover the output gap, the government is assumed to have a bias, other things equal,
for the maintenance of the status quo. The higher θ is, the stronger the bias will be.
The borrowing government’s utility UG monotonically decreases with the distance
between the adjustment program s, which is actually implemented, and its preferred
13We assume quadratic loss functions for tractability.
14More generally, conﬂicts of interest over desired policy may reﬂect various causes. There may simply
be ideological diﬀerences over what is the best way to achieve the same goal. Alternatively, simple
uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reforms may make governments fail to
adopt policies considered to be eﬃciency-enhancing (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991).
13program s∗











2.3 The agency problem
The diﬀerence between s∗
IMF and s∗
G represents the extent of the agency problem between





G = γe+ θb = B
where θb captures the government’s “status quo” bias, due to domestic lobbies’ pressures.
Whereas γe captures the extent of the divergence between the Fund and the govern-
ment objectives related to the existence of some externalities in the government’s policy
choices.16
We should note that in our setting, unlike in the standard Principal-Agent model,
the preferences of the countries’ authorities and of the IMF are, to some extent, aligned.
In fact, both the government and the IMF do care about the eﬀects of the adjustment
program on national output, and when θ = γ =0they actually coincide.
Finally it is worth noting that in the model we do not question the borrowing coun-
try’s ability to repay the IMF loan and we do not model the choice of the loan size. These
assumptions are indeed strong but they allow us to focus on the issue of information
transmission and on its implications for the choice of conditionality vs. ownership. In
other words, we neglect the IMF’s role as a lender to emphasize its role as an advisor.
15Again, we assume quadratic loss functions for tractability.
16National governments do not generally internalize the impact of their policy actions on their neigh-
boring countries (like, for example, tariﬀs, subsidies, and other trade protection policies). Therefore,
the IMF’s multilateral orientation may generate some conﬂicts of interest with the recipient governments
(Mayer and Mourmouras, 2005)
14Indeed, in the last decade, the IMF has become more involved in promoting growth and
economic stability by designing appropriate economic reforms.
2.4 Timing
The sequence of events is assumed to be the following. First, the IMF decides whether or
not to delegate to the government the control over the choice of the adjustment program.
Next, the government learns e a and the IMF learns e p. If authority has been delegated,
t h eg o v e r n m e n ta s k st h eI M Ff o rt e c h n i c a la d v i c ea n dt h e nc h o o s e st h ep r o g r a m ,w h i l e ,i f
authority has not been delegated, the IMF asks the country for advice and then chooses
the program. Finally, the government implements the program and outcomes realize.
3 Conditionality versus Ownership
In our model the IMF has two instruments to use the local knowledge of the recipient
government: ownership (delegation) and conditionality (centralization).17
By ownership, we refer to a situation in which the IMF delegates the recipient gov-
ernment the choice of the adjustment program, which implies that the government can
choose autonomously the policies to be implemented. We assume that in designing the
program the government asks the IMF’s advice at the negotiation stage, but then it de-
cides the structure of the program without the IMF’s approval. In this case, the IMF
does not engage in monitoring a country’s policy actions; rather it subordinates the con-
tinuation of the disbursements to the achievement of some pre-determined outcomes. We
will show that ownership will result in an under-utilization of the Fund’s information and
17Following Dessein (2002) and Harris and Raviv (2005) we assume that the two parties cannot commit
to a decision rule that is not ex-post optimal for the decision maker. This implies that they cannot commit
to an incentive compatible decision rule in which the Revelation Principle applies. Hence, the principal
(the Fund) cannot use a standard mechanism to elicit the private information of the agent. However, she
can commit to transfer decision making authority to the agent.
15in a suboptimal adjustment program due to the government’s bias.18
By conditionality, instead, we refer to a situation in which the IMF fully controls the
design of the adjustment program and tries to exploit the government’s private information
by asking for its advice at the negotiation stage. Then, the Fund chooses the adjustment
policies and the government implements them. The IMF monitors the economic reforms
and it subordinates the continuation of the agreement to the country’s compliance with
the program. Conditional lending avoids the government’s bias but it will induce under-
utilization of the government’s information.19
In this section, we will study both instruments separately.
4O w n e r s h i p
We start by examining the ownership case. First, we introduce some notation. Let
t ∈ [0,P] denote the message that the IMF sends to the government when asked to give
its technical advice. Let q(t|p) denote the density function that the IMF sends message t
when it has observed p. This is the reporting rule chosen by the IMF. Further, let g(p|t)
denote the density function that the IMF’s private information is p, when the government
observes message t. Finally, let s(a,t) be the government’s action rule depending on the
IMF’s message t and on its private information a. A Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
for this communication game is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the communication game consists
18While in principle the IMF might control for the government’s bias by the threat of interrupting the
disbursements in case of non compliance with the pre-determined outcomes, we are implicitly assuming
that such incentive scheme does not manage to eliminate completely the agency problem. There are
many reasons why the IMF threat of program interruption cannot be credible. For a discussion on this
see Marchesi and Sabani (2007a).
19This is a strong assumption. We are assuming that when the IMF chooses and monitors the adjust-
ment policies, its monitoring technology is fully eﬃcient, which is at odds with reality (e.g., Marchesi and
Sabani, 2007b). However, what is actually crucial for the model is the fact that monitoring the policy
actions reduces the bias with respect to the case in which the IMF simply monitors the ﬁnal outcomes,
which seems plausible.
16in a family of reporting rule q(t|p) and an action rule for the government s(a,t) such
that: 1) for each p ∈ [0,P],
R
R q(t|p) dt =1 , where the Borel set R is the set of all
possible signals t.I ft∗ is in the support of q(t|p), t∗ is such that:



















Condition (1) says that the reporting rule q(t|p) chosen by the IMF yields an ex-
pected loss minimizing adjustment program s, given the government’s choice rule s(a,t).
In other words, the equilibrium reporting rule q(t|p) induces the government to choose
an adjustment program s(a,t), which minimizes the expected loss of the IMF. Condition
(2) says that the government responds optimally to each IMF’s report t.T h eg o v e r n m e n t
uses Bayes’ rule to update its prior on p, given the IMF’s reporting strategy and the signal
received. Namely, given the IMF’s report t and the posterior density function of p given
t (g(p|t)),s (a,t) minimizes the government’s expected loss.
The government’s equilibrium adjustment program choice creates some endogenous
signalling costs for the IMF, which allow for equilibria with partial sorting. Indeed,
the model has multiple equilibria which are all “partition” equilibria, in which the IMF
introduces some noise in the information transmitted by simply not discriminating as
ﬁnely as possible in the signal transmitted among the diﬀerent states of nature it is
capable to distinguish.20 More precisely, it is possible to show that there is a ﬁnite upper
bound N(B,P) on the number of sub-intervals of the equilibrium partition and that there
exists at least one equilibrium for each size from N =1(uninformative equilibrium) to
N = N(B,P) (most informative equilibrium).
20See Lemma 1 in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
17Let p(N)=p0(N),p 1(N),......,pN(N) denote a partition of [0,P], where 0=p0(N) <
p1(N) <,...... < pN(N). The following proposition characterizes the relevant equilibrium
for the communication game.
Proposition 2 Suppose B (= γe+θb) is such that UIMF is diﬀerent from UG for all p.
Then there exists a positive integer N(B,P) such that for each N with 1 ≤ N ≤ N(B,P),
there exists at least one equilibrium (q(t|p);s(a,t)), where q(t|p) is uniform, supported
on [pi,p i+1], and s(a,t)=a +
pi+pi+1















2 ) − (a + pi) − B
¤2
f(a)da
(ii) p0 =0 ;pN = P
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 1 in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
(i) is an “arbitrage” condition which says that for states of nature that fall on the
boundaries of two intervals the IMF must be indiﬀerent between the actions (s(a,t)) on
these two intervals.21 (i) deﬁnes a second order linear diﬀerential equation on pi, while
(ii) speciﬁes its initial and terminal conditions. Since the IMF is not informed on the true
value of a, when choosing t,i tw i l lt a k et h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo fa,t h a ti sA
2. The arbitrage












(i =1 ,...,N − 1), (6)
from which it is easily obtained
pi+1 =2 pi − pi−1 +4 B (7)
This second order linear diﬀerence equation has a class of solutions parametrized by p1
(given p0=0 ):
pi = ip1 +2 i(i − 1)B, (i =1 ,...,N− 1).
21In the uniform quadratic case the arbitrage condition is a second order diﬀerence equation.
18Given that pN = P we have:
p1 =
P − 2N(N − 1)B
N




− 2i(N − i)B, (i =1 ,...,N), (8)
By imposing the condition p1 ≥ 0, N(B,P) is the largest positive integer N such that:
P − 2N(N − 1)B ≥ 0
















where hvi denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to v.22
N(B,P) denotes the (maximum) precision of the information transmitted by the
Fund, which is decreasing with the government’s bias B and is increasing with the length
of the support of p (i.e., the IMF’s informational advantage).23 Speciﬁcally, for any
given P, the precision of the information transmitted by the Fund decreases with the
relevance of the bias B. On the contrary, for any given B, the IMF’s incentive in not
excessively distorting the information rises with the IMF’s informational advantage P.
That is, it increases with the relevance of the IMF’s private information in designing
the program. The intuition for the last result basically depends on the fact that when
the IMF’s information is especially relevant, the costs of a non informative report might









2 is the positive root of 2N(N − 1)B − A =0minus one.
23Speciﬁcally, the closer B approaches zero, the more nearly agents’ interests coincide, the “ﬁner”
partition equilibria can be.
19From (8) it is easily obtained :
pi − pi−1 =
P
N
+2 ( 2 i − N − 1)B. (9)
The width of the interval increases by 4B for each increase in i. Intuitively, anticipating
that the IMF is biased towards larger values of s, relative to the government, the govern-
ment considers the IMF more reliable when it reports small values of p. This implies that
the smaller is the value of p, the more the IMF is credible and thus the more information
is transmitted.
In the ownership (delegation) game, using (9), the IMF’s ex ante expected loss (LO)






































p denotes the residual variance of p the government expects to have before being











p is decreasing with N. More precisely, if N =1 , there is no communication and
σ2
p is at a maximum, while if N = N(B,P),σ 2
p is at a minimum.24
Since both players’ ex ante expected loss is decreasing with the residual variance of
p, Crawford and Sobel assume that both agents coordinate on N(B,P), w h i c hi st h u sa
focal equilibrium.25
Lemma 3 In the focal equilibrium the IMF’s ex ante expected loss is continuous and
increasing in P.
24It is easy to verify that when N =1(uninformative partition) the residual variance σ2
p is equal to the
total variance P 2
12 . To the contrary, for a given N, the residual variance increases with b. Indeed, when
b =0 , the residual variance is equal to P
2
12N2, which is smaller than the total variance, for N>1.
25This result depends on the hypothesis of quadratic objective functions.
20Proof. See the Appendix
Lemma 3 shows that since (under delegation) the IMF’s information is under-utilized,
the Fund’s expected loss increases with P that is with the relevance of its private infor-
mation.
4.1 Conditionality
In the centralization game the situation is entirely symmetric to the delegation game.
In the case of conditionality, the IMF is supposed to choose the adjustment program s,
knowing p and after having negotiated with the government the design of the program.
In the negotiation phase IMF oﬃcials must persuade the government to share country-
speciﬁc information (data on both economic and sociopolitical issues) in order to better
screen among possible adjustment programs. As before, the government’s report r is
determined by a partition {ai} of [0,A ]. Given the government’s report r, it is possible
to deﬁne a reporting rule q(r|a) and a posterior belief g(a|r)=
q(r|a)f(a)
U A
0 q(r|θ)f(θ)d(θ) such that,
given the report r ∈ [ai,a i+1], the IMF’s expected value of a is
ai+ai+1
2 (posterior mean of

















(i =1 ,...,N− 1), (11)
where, solving for ai+1, we obtain:
ai+1 =2 ai − ai−1 − 4B, (i =1 ,...,N − 1). (12)
21This second order linear diﬀerence equation has a class of solutions parameterized by
a1 (given a0 =0 ) :
ai = ia1 − 2i(i − 1)B (i =1 ,...,N). (13)
Since aN = A we have:
a1 =
A +2 N(N − 1)b
N
(14)









where hvi denotes the smallest integer greater or equal to v. It is easily veriﬁed that v is
a continuous and decreasing function of B and a continuous and increasing function of A.
N(B,A) denotes the maximum precision of the government’s information transmission. It
is increasing with the length of the support of a (government’s informational advantage)
and decreasing with the government’s bias B.
As before the intuition for this result basically depends on the government’s incentive
to avoid excessive distortions in the transmission of information. Speciﬁcally, for a given
B, the government’s incentive in not excessively distorting the information clearly rises
with the increase in the government’s informational advantage A.
Let LC denote the IMF’s ex ante expected loss for an equilibrium of size N, where C
stands for conditionality (centralization game). Given the partition 0=a0(N) <a 1(N) <
,...... < aN(N)=A, using (13) and substituting for the value of a1 in (14) (determined




+2 i(N − i)B (i =1 ,...,N), (15)
from which it is easy to derive:
ai − ai−1 =
A
N
− 2(2i − N − 1)B.
22Note that the width of the interval decreases by 4B for each increase in i. Namely, the
larger is the observed value of a, the more information is actually communicated by the
government. Intuitively, anticipating that the government is biased towards smaller values
of s, relatively to the IMF, the IMF considers the government to be more reliable when































a denotes the residual variance of a t h eI M Fe x p e c t st oh a v ee xa n t e ,b e f o r eb e i n g
reported the equilibrium value of r by the government. Crawford and Sobel show that










a is decreasing with N. More precisely, if N =1t h e r ei sn oc o m m u n i c a t i o na n dσ2
a
is at a maximum, while if N = N(B,A),σ 2
a is at a minimum.26 Since both players’ ex
ante expected loss is decreasing with the residual variance of a (σ2
a), we can focus on the
focal equilibrium. Then, the following Lemma is established:
Lemma 4 In the focal equilibrium the IMF’s ex ante expected loss is continuous and
increasing in A
Proof. See the appendix
Centralization avoids the bias but it results in under-utilization of a government’s
information. Indeed, Lemma 4 shows that the IMF’s ex ante expected loss under condi-
tionality is increasing in the informational advantage of the government A.
26It is easy to verify that when N =1(uninformative partition) the residual variance σ2
a is equal to
the total variance A2
12 . To the contrary, for a given N, the residual variance increases with b. Indeed, when
b =0 , the residual variance is equal to A2
12N2, which is smaller than the total variance, for N>1.
235 Choice between ownership and conditionality: a
comparative analysis
Proposition 5 The IMF prefers conditional lending (no ownership) iﬀ P ≥ P(A,B),
where P(A,B) is continuous and increasing in A and for any b, P(A,B) <A
Proof. See the appendix
Proposition 5 shows that the IMF will prefer conditional lending (no delegation)
when its informational advantage is greater than a threshold level P(A,B),w h i c h ,f o r
any B, is shown to be smaller than A. This means that the Fund will always choose not
to delegate whenever its private information is more important that the agent’s private
information, that is P>A . Furthermore, the IMF will still opt for conditionality even
when P(A,B) ≤ P<A .This means that, due to the country’s own bias, the Fund can
optimally choose not to delegate even if its informational advantage is strictly smaller than
A (see Figure 1). In this case, the loss related to an under-utilization of the government’s
information is more than compensated by the elimination of the bias and by the full
utilization of the IMF’s private information. Finally, to choose ownership (delegation),
the IMF’s private information P h a st ob es m a l l e rt h a nP(A,B).
FIGURE 1 HERE
6 Empirical model
What do we observe in reality? In order to test the predictions of our theoretical model,
the basic idea is testing the role that information plays in the design of IMF programs.
According to our theoretical results, we expect that a delegation scheme (ownership)
would prevail when the importance of the country’s local knowledge dominates either the
size of the bias in the objective function of the country’s government or the importance of
the IMF’s knowledge. To the contrary, we expect a centralization scheme (conventional
24conditionality) to prevail when either the importance of the IMF’s knowledge or the size
o ft h eb i a sd o m i n a t e st h er o l eo ft h ec o u n t r y ’ sk n o w l e d g e .
More speciﬁcally, we want to empirically investigate the "scope" (i.e. the degree
of "intrusiveness") of conditionality in relation to information transmission problems. In
this context, a "narrower" (or less intrusive) conditionality could be considered as a proxy
for a greater degree of ownership. We will deﬁne conditionality to be “narrower” when
the number of conditions included in a program — as listed in the letter of intent — is
comparably small. In fact, a smaller number of conditions could be considered to be a
proxy for delegation since conditions decrease the degrees of freedom of the borrowing
country’s authorities.27 The number of conditions has been used as a proxy for stringency
of conditionality in a number of previous studies. E.g., Mosley (1991) studied the tightness
of World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans using this measure. Ivanova et al. (2003),
Gould (2003), Dreher and Jensen (2007), and Copelovitch (2009) utilized them to measure
the extent of conditionality; the IMF (2001) has used similar data in empirical analysis
as well.
Rather then employing the number of conditions, Stone (2008) suggests to use the
number of areas those conditions refer to. In particular, Stone employs data on the num-
ber of categories of conditions applied under all IMF programs between 1992 and 2002.
According to his results, conditionality is the outcome of a bargaining process between
the Fund and the borrowing country, where such bargaining power is "used" asymmet-
rically. Speciﬁcally, conditionality has been narrower where the borrowing country was
an important recipient of U.S. aid (and also faced external vulnerability) but the Fund
has refrained from stronger levels of conditionality when countries were "vulnerable." In
other words, conditionality has been narrower for countries actively seeking Fund support
and thus already facing strong incentives to reform.
27It could be considered only as a proxy since the actual autonomy of a country’s authorities would
also depend on the quality of such conditions.
25Controlling for countries’ characteristics, their economic performance and for the
IMF’s political motivations, we empirically investigate the determinants of the scope of
conditionality over the years and across countries, focusing on its potential eﬀects for
information transmission. More speciﬁcally, we expect to ﬁnd a narrower conditionality
in countries whose local knowledge is more important than the IMF’s knowledge and the
agency bias.
As a robustness check, in Section 8, we will replicate the empirical analysis taking
the number of areas covered by a Fund program, rather than the number of conditions,
as the dependent variable.
6.1 Data
6.1.1 IMF conditionality
The IMF’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) database contains more than
22,000 conditions in almost 300 programs approved over the period March 31, 1992 —
June 4, 2008, as used in Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009). This amounts to about 3,100
conditions in 27 Extended Fund Facility Arrangements (EFF), almost 12,000 under 139
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangements, and about 7,500 in 129 Stand-by
Arrangements. 14,500 of those conditions are performance criteria, 2,500 are prior actions,
and 5,200 are structural benchmarks. Not all of these conditions enter the arrangements
when the respective program is initiated, of course, but are added over the course of the
program. Usually, compliance with these conditions is monitored on a quarterly basis.
Ideally, we would want to count only those conditions that were included at the
initiation of the program. However, the structure of the MONA database (as we have
access to) does not provide this information for many of the programs. While we do know
which conditions have been included in the program, the time at which the condition
26did enter is not indicated. For our analysis, we calculate the sum of all the conditions.
As the resulting number is obviously larger the longer a program is in eﬀect, we control
for the number of quarters that it is eﬀective in the empirical analysis below. Table 1
reports the number of conditions per program and type. In the lower panel of the Table,
the total number of conditions is divided by the number of quarters the programs are in
eﬀect. When a condition is included at all test dates throughout the program, it is thus
counted as “one.” While the average number of conditions listed in the table is a good
proxy for the number of performance criteria, it represents a lower bound for structural
benchmarks and prior actions. This is because a speciﬁc performance criterion is usually
included throughout the program, while prior actions and benchmarks “come and go.”
For more details see Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009).
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6.1.2 Control variables
Our choice of control variables follows the literature on the determinants of IMF credit
supply and participation in IMF programs.28 Economic variables include the current
account balance (relative to GDP), per capita income, the rate of inﬂation, GDP growth,
and the amount of international reserves (relative to imports).29 Political variables include
temporary membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and voting in line
with the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). According to the recent
results of Dreher et al. (2006, 2009) and Dreher and Jensen (2007) countries voting in line
with the U.S. in the UNGA and temporary members of the UNSC receive IMF programs
28See Steinwand and Stone (2008) for a recent survey.
29We have also included the domestic (ﬁxed) investment (to GDP), the growth of government consump-
tion (to GDP), total debt service (to exports) and total external debt (to GDP). While these additional
variables have not been signiﬁcant at conventional levels of signiﬁcance, our main results are not aﬀected
by the inclusion of these variables.
27with fewer conditions.30
Our variables of interests are the so called “informational variables.” Such variables
are meant to capture the impact of a country’s bias on the number of (and areas covered
by) conditions, of its local knowledge, and of the IMF’s knowledge. First of all, the
objective function of the country’s authorities may not fully coincide with domestic welfare
maximization for political economy reasons, while the IMF’s objective function may not
coincide with domestic welfare maximization because policies in one country may impose
negative externalities on its neighbors (especially trade and exchange rate policies).
According to the political economy literature, measures of political instability and
of polarization and social division (e.g., Tabellini and Alesina, 1990; Alesina and Drazen,
1991) and whether the government is democratically elected (Besley and Case, 1995)
should account for country’s “resistance” towards reforms.31 Therefore, in order to “cap-
ture” the country’s bias in the empirical model we considered measures of "institutional
capacity" and "socioeconomic complexity." On that respect we included some of the In-
ternational Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) indicators: government stability, law and order,
bureaucracy quality, and ethnic tensions. These (subjective) indices range from zero to 12,
with higher values showing “better” environments. High scores on the bureaucratic qual-
ity variable indicate “autonomy from political pressure” and “established mechanisms for
recruiting and training.” Government stability is “a measure of the government’s ability
to carry out its declared program(s) and its ability to stay in oﬃce.” Law and order refers
30Kuziemko and Werker (2006) also ﬁnd that countries serving on the UNSC receive more United
Nations Development Project support, and more direct foreign aid from the United States. This eﬀect
increases when members’ votes should be especially valuable, i.e., during years in which key diplomatic
events take place
31In Tabellini and Alesina (1990), under political instability and polarization, a balanced budget is not
a political equilibrium, since the current majority does not internalize the costs of budget deﬁcits and the
more so the greater is the diﬀerence between its preferences and the expected preferences of the future
majority. Alesina and Drazen (1991) ﬁnd that, when stabilization has signiﬁcant distributional implica-
tions, a “war of attrition” among diﬀerent socioeconomic groups may delay stabilization. Finally, Besley
and Case (1995), testing a reputation-building model of political behaviour, ﬁnd that (gubernatorial)
term limits (consistent only with democracy) have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on economic policy choices.
28to the impartiality of the legal system and the assessment of popular observance of the
law, while ethnic tensions measure “the degree of tension within a country attributable
to racial, nationality or language divisions” (PRS Group 1998).32 We also included an
index of democracy as deﬁned in the Polity IV dataset (ranging from -10 to 10).
Moreover, we considered measures of both economic and ﬁnancial openness since
the bias between the country and the IMF may also depend on the existence of some
externalities generated by the government’s policy choices, which in turn will be more
inﬂuential the greater the trade and cross-border capital ﬂows.33 Speciﬁcally, we included
the sum of a country’s imports and exports (relative to GDP).34
We assume that the importance of a country’s local knowledge is supposed to be cru-
cial for less transparent countries and for countries with a more complex socioeconomic
structure (but with a sound institutional capacity, that is with a small bias). In order to
measure the importance of a country’s local knowledge we use indexes of transparency,
such as democracy and press freedom (the latter taken from Freedom House 2006). Our
main index follows Rosendorﬀ and Vreeland (2008) who suggest missing data on stan-
dard economic indicators (like inﬂation, etc.) as indicators of transparency.35 Rather
than choosing any arbitrary data series, however, we evaluate all 250 series classiﬁed as
32We tried to control for some of the other ICRG indicators, such as corruption, investment proﬁle
and social conditions and our results are unchanged. We also tried to include the variable “strength of
special interests” (referring to the share of seats in the parliament held by “special interests” parties) and
"education" but missing data reduced the sample substantially, so we do not report the results below.
Diﬀerent speciﬁcations are available upon request.
33In recent years the rapid increase in trade and cross-border capital ﬂows has tied countries more
closely together.
34We have also included the KOF Index of Globalization and its subcomponent on economic restrictions
(Dreher 2006). This index is the ﬁrst principal component of four categories of restrictions: The existence
of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions on capital account
transactions, and requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. The Chinn-Ito (2007) measure of
ﬁnancial openness is also employed.
35Another index that might come to mind is membership in the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination
Standard (SDDS). When including a dummy for whether or not a country has met the SDDS requirements
for transparency, its coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The same applies for
a dummy indicating whether or not a country posted data on the General Data Dissemination System
(GDDS).
29“economics” in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2008). Our resulting
transparency indicator shows the share of series for which there is no data available in a
given country and year. In addition, as indicators of socioeconomic complexity we use two
variables: “social conditions” and “ethnic tensions” from the ICRG introduced above.
A poor quality of governmental staﬀ could also be a reason why a country may be
in need of the Fund’s technical advice. In order to capture that, we included the index
of “bureaucratic quality." Finally, the role of the IMF’s speciﬁc knowledge will be more
relevant for more open countries since the IMF, as a multilateral institution, could be an
ideal place to internalize spillovers (Rajan, 2008). We employ the indicators of openness
introduced above to test this hypothesis.
Of course some of the indicators refer, at the same time, to the inﬂuence of the bias
or to the importance of the local or IMF knowledge. Since the impact of such indicators
could have opposite eﬀects, in these cases the sign of the coeﬃcient will tell us the “net
eﬀect”, i.e., the impact that dominates.
Table 2 contains all the details on our variable deﬁnitions and sources, including
those that have been tried, but are not included in the speciﬁcations reported below (see
footnotes 29, 31, and 33). Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix.
TABLE 2 HERE
6.1.3 Some descriptive evidence
Figure 2 relates the average number of conditions per program to selected potential deter-
minants. As discussed above, the recent literature suggests voting in line with a respective
other country in the United Nations General Assembly and temporary membership in the
United Nations Security Council as important determinants of the number of IMF condi-
tions. We therefore split the sample according to UNSC membership and to UNGA voting,
30respectively. Regarding UNGA voting, we divided the sample according to whether or
not a country’s voting coincidence in the UNGA is below or rather above the median of
0.38. The dummy for UNSC membership is one in the two years a country is a temporary
member of the UNSC, and zero otherwise. In coding our index of UNGA voting, we follow
Thacker (1999), who codes votes in agreement with the U.S. as 1, votes in disagreement
as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. Figure 2 also shows the average number of condi-
tions included in an IMF program separated according to the median of the Transparency
index and the ICRG’s index of law and order.
A sc a nb es e e n ,t h ed e s c r i p t i v ee v i d e n c ei si nl i n ew i t ho u re x p e c t a t i o n s .T h eo v e r a l l
number of conditions included in an IMF program (i.e., not controlled for the duration
of the program) increases with more transparency, at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance
(according to a t-test). It decreases with better law and order, and voting in line with
the U.S. in the UNGA. It is lower for countries who have been temporary UNSC member
when being under an IMF program. However, not controlled for additional determinants
of the number of conditions, these diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
FIGURE 2 HERE
7M e t h o d a n d R e s u l t s
We examine the determinants of the number of conditions in IMF programs over the
period 1992-2005. Our sample comprises a maximum of 281 programs from 97 countries,
depending on the control variables we include. As count data often show non-normal
distributions we ﬁrst test for the normality of our dependent variable. The variable shows
a nicely bell-shaped distribution and the null-hypothesis of normality is not rejected at
conventional levels of signiﬁcance. We therefore adopt a GLS ﬁxed eﬀects estimator in
order to control for country unobservables and to correct for AR(1) autocorrelation within
31panels and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across countries (rather then referring to
count models like Poisson or Negative Binomial Regression).36
Speciﬁcally, we test:
Cit = α + β1Zit + qit + ηi + uit (17)
where Cit represents the number of conditions in IMF programs in country i at year t, q
measures the number of quarters a speciﬁcp r o g r a mh a sb e e ni ne ﬀect, and Z is a vector
containing the variables introduced above. Finally, ηi are country ﬁxed eﬀects.
The results of the full model of equation (17) are presented in Table 3, column
3. In column 1 we report the coeﬃcients of the variables that are meant to capture
the “informational component” only, while column 2 is restricted to the values of the
coeﬃcients of the variables related to economic and political factors. First of all, we can
observe that the impact of most variables is robust to the inclusion of the economic and
political variables and of the informational variables. There are two exceptions. The ﬁrst
is bureaucratic quality which is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels in the full model;
the second is openness to trade, which is only signiﬁcant (at the ﬁve percent level) once
controlled for the political variables.
As column 3 shows, the results support our hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of the
informational variables on the number of IMF conditions. Consistent with our theoretical
model, more open countries obtain more conditions, at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁ-
cance. Since more conditions imply a greater degree of centralization, for countries which
are more open, the role of the multilateral institution as a place to internalize spillovers
increases. According to our theoretical results, centralization dominates delegation when
36The FGLS estimator has been shown to perform eﬃciently under heteroskedasticity and autocorre-
lation as compared to standard panel estimators. Note that the FGLS correction for a single AR(1) term
is unlikely to cause the standard errors to be ﬂawed as would be the case employing the Parks correction
with individual AR(1) terms for each country (Beck and Katz 1995: 637). In all speciﬁcations a likeli-
hood ratio test rejects the hypothesis of no AR(1) at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. The procedure
of estimation employed here is standard in the recent literature (see, e.g., Kilby 2006).
32the importance of the Fund’s knowledge increases and also because for more open coun-
tries the bias of the countries’ authorities is greater, which also goes in the direction of
centralization.
The number of conditions rises with the absence of “ethnic tensions,” at the one
percent level of signiﬁcance. Since for all ICRG indexes higher scores indicate "better"
environments, the higher the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial,
nationality or language divisions, the lower the number of conditions. In other words,
there is more room for delegation when a country is more complex from a social point
of view (provided its institutions are sound enough). Also at the one percent level, the
number of conditions decreases with “law and order,” implying that a lower strength and
impartiality of the legal system (i.e., weaker institutions or a larger bias) increases the
number of IMF conditions. This conﬁrms our theoretical prediction according to which
centralization should dominate delegation when the bias of the countries’ authorities is
t o ol a r g e .T ot h ec o n t r a r y ,t h ec o e ﬃcient of the variable “government stability” is positive
and highly signiﬁcant. Here, the smaller the bias, the greater the number of conditions
would be. This actually contradicts our theoretical conclusions as we would expect more
delegation (fewer conditions) for more stable (less biased countries). This result, however,
is in line with the previous literature according to which the IMF might not want to
further destabilize already weak governments by imposing numerous conditions which the
government would be politically held accountable for.37
Our index for the lack of transparency is signiﬁcant at the one percent level and
has the expected negative coeﬃcient. Controlled for institutional quality, the lack of
transparency justiﬁes the importance of the country authority’s knowledge as compared
to the IMF’s knowledge. In line with our theoretical model, more transparent countries
37Stone (2008), for example, ﬁnds that the number of areas rises signiﬁcantly with the number of
seats in parliament supporting the government, while it decreases with the number of coalition members
participating in the government. Both variables are clearly related to government stability.
33receive more conditions.
As expected, the number of conditions is positively aﬀected by the duration of a
program (i.e., by the number of quarters that a program is eﬀective), at the one percent
level of signiﬁcance. Turning to the economic and political control variables, countries
with lower values in their per capita GDP and higher deﬁcits in their current account
receive a greater number of conditions, both signiﬁcant at the one percent level. This is
c o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ei d e at h a tm o r ec o n d i t i o n sa r en e e d e dw h e nt h ee c o n o m i cc o n d i t i o n s
that countries face are more diﬃcult. Finally, consistently with previous studies (e.g., see
Dreher et al., 2006, 2009 and Dreher and Jensen, 2007), we ﬁnd that countries voting
in line with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly and countries which are temporary
members of the UN Security Council obtain fewer conditions in their IMF programs
(signiﬁcant at the one and, respectively, ten percent level). Democracy, freedom of the
press, GDP growth, international reserves and inﬂation are not signiﬁcantly related to
the number of conditions (according to the full model of column 3).
Regarding the quantitative impact of our variables of interest, the results of column 3
imply that an increase by one point on the 12-scale index of government stability increases
the number of conditions by more than 3. An increase (decrease) by one point on the
law and order (ethnic tensions) index reduces (increases) the number of conditions by
8.4 (15.4). A one percentage point increase in trade openness increases the number of
conditions by 0.3; one additional category (out of 250) for which no data is reported
reduces it by 1.2 (=(1/250)*287). With each additional quarter an IMF program remains
in eﬀect, almost 7 additional conditions enter.
INSERT TABLE 3
The next section tests for the robustness of these ﬁndings.
348 Test for robustness
As a check for robustness we replicate the analysis considering as the dependent variable
the number of areas covered by an IMF program, rather than the number of conditions.38
To capture the scope of IMF conditionality we follow Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland
(2009) and build 20 categories, allocating all conditions to one of them, with the 20st
category containing the residual. These categories refer to: Arrears, Balance of Pay-
ments/Reserves, the Capital Account more broadly, Central Bank Reform, Credit to
Government, Debt, Exchange system, Financial sector, Governance, Government Budget,
Monetary Ceiling, Pricing, Private Sector Reforms, Privatization, Public Sector, Social,
Systemic, Trade and Wages & Pensions. Clearly, these categories are to some extent
arbitrary and some of them represent sub-categories of others.
The lower panel of Table 1 gives an overview about the number of areas covered
by the average IMF program, overall, and split according to type of condition. As can
be seen, the average IMF program covers 10 areas; 7 areas are covered by performance
criteria, on average, 2 by prior actions, and 4 by structural benchmarks. The minimum
number of areas covered by conditions is one; the maximum 17, and the median 10 (not
shown in the table).
Table 4 reports the empirical results. As can be seen, they are very similar to those
presented in Table 3. Among our variables of interest, the exception is democracy which
increases the number of areas covered by conditionality at the ten percent level according
to the full model of column 3. This is again in line with our hypothesis implying that
higher transparency leads to tougher conditionality.39 Among the covariates, the scope
of the conditions now increases with higher GDP growth, at the one percent level of
38Again, the null hypothesis of normality is not rejected for conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
39At least this eﬀect dominates the other one, according to which a smaller bias (due to higher democ-
racy) would justify more delegation (i.e. fewer conditions).
35signiﬁcance. Temporary UNSC membership and UNGA voting in line with the U.S. are
marginally insigniﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients imply that an increase by one point on the government stability
index increases the number of areas covered by conditions by more than 0.3. An increase
(decrease) by one point on the law and order (ethnic tensions) index reduces (increases)
the number of areas by 0.14 (0.6). A one percentage point increase in trade openness
increases the number of areas covered by conditions by 0.03; one additional category
for which no data is reported reduces it by 0.02 (=(1/250)*5.28). With each additional
quarter an IMF program remains in eﬀect, 0.2 additional areas are covered. Finally, an
increase in the index of democracy by one point reduces the number of areas covered by
almost 0.1.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
9C o n c l u s i o n s
The approach to conditionality and ownership presented in this paper has focussed on the
importance of the transmission of information between the IMF and the borrowing coun-
try in designing the most eﬃcient "incentive contract." More speciﬁcally, the combination
of special interest politics (agency problems) and informational asymmetries presents se-
rious problems as the implementation of Fund conditionality is concerned, especially in
programs with a structural orientation. Given the imperfect observability of both actions
and outcomes, we have focussed on the speciﬁc role that the transmission of information
between the IMF and the borrowing government has for the choice between delegation
(ownership) and centralization (conventional conditionality). We ﬁnd that when agency
problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is particularly valuable, central-
ization is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than
36the agency bias we expect delegation to be the optimal incentive scheme.
What do we observe in reality? As a natural extension of the paper we have em-
pirically investigated the "scope" (i.e. the degree of "intrusiveness") of conditionality in
relation to information transmission problems. In this context, a "narrower" conditional-
ity has been considered to be a proxy for a greater degree of ownership. We have deﬁned
conditionality to be “narrower” when the number of program conditions is relatively small.
Alternatively, conditionality has been deﬁned to be “narrower” when it includes only a
relatively small number of areas covered by conditions (Stone, 2008).
Controlling for countries’ characteristics, their economic performance, and for the
IMF’s political motivations, we ﬁnd that the empirical results support our hypotheses
regarding the eﬀect of the informational variables on the number of IMF conditions. More
speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the number of conditions increases with the bias of the countries’
authorities and for more open countries. More open countries obtain more conditions
also because multilaterals become the ideal place to internalize spillovers. In line with
the theoretical model, more transparent countries receive more condition as in this case
the importance of the country’s knowledge decreases. To the contrary, the number of
conditions decreases with a country’s social complexity.
Finally, we ﬁnd very similar results when we take the number of areas covered by an
IMF program, rather than the number of conditions, as the dependent variable.
I ti sw o r t h w h i l et on o t et h a tt h ea r g u m e n tw em a k ei nt h i sp a p e ri sn o tr e s t r i c t e dt o
the relationship between the Fund and a recipient country but could also be applied to
other types of conditional reform programs (e.g., foreign aid, EU conditionality).
37Appendix
Proof. Lemma 3 The proof follows directly from Lemma 1 in Harris and Raviv
(2005)
L(N,B,P) is continuous and increasing in P. Deﬁne Pn to be the value of P such
that N(B,Pn) jumps from n−1 to n. Noting that N(B,Pn)=n−1. At such point from
(8) we obtain:
0=Pn − 2Bn(n − 1)
solving for Pn :
Pn =2 Bn(n − 1) (A.1)
and we obtain:
L(n − 1,B,2Bn(n − 1)) =
(2Bn(n − 1))2
12(n − 1)2 +






















L(n − 1,B,P n)=L(n,B,Pn) for P ∈ [Pn,Pn+1].
This implies that L(N,B,P) is continuous in Pn although N(B,Pn) is not continuous in
Pn. Furthermore, since L(n,B,Pn) is increasing in Pn, for a ﬁxed n, and L(N(B,Pn),B,P n)
is continuous in Pn, it follows that L(N(B,Pn),b,P n) is increasing in Pn.
Proof. Lemma 4 I tf o l l o w st h es a m ea r g u m e n ta sL e m m a3 .
Proof. Proposition 5 The proof follows directly from Theorem 1 in Harris and
Raviv (2005).
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Pn is deﬁned by (A.1), b An is deﬁned by (A.3) below and n = N(B,A). Furthermore,
P(A,B) is increasing and continuous in A,a n df o ra n yB,P(A,B) ≤ [max{−12B2 + A2,0}]
1
2 ,then
P(A,B) <A , for all B.
Deﬁne A = b An such that the IMF is indiﬀerent between ownership (with P = Pn)
and conditionality (with A = b An).
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38Solving for b An,we obtain:
b An =2 Bn(n
2 − 2n +4 )
1
2 (A.3)
It can be veriﬁed that:
Pn ≤ b An ≤ Pn+1




and P is such that the IMF is indiﬀerent between condition-
ality and ownership. Then P must satisfy
B
2 + L(n − 1,B,P)=L(n,B,A)
and
P2
12(n − 1)2 +








Thus, it follows that
P =
p








and P is such that the IMF is indiﬀerent between

















(−12B2n2 + A2) (A.5)
Combining (A.4) and (A.5) yields P(A,B) given in the statement of the proposition. It is
easy to check that the function is continuous in A. The IMF prefers conditional lending
iﬀ
B
2 + L(N(B,P),B,P) ≥ L(N(B,A),B,A)
By deﬁnition of P(A,B):
B
2 + L(N(B,P(A,B)),B,P(A,B)) = L(N(B,A),B,A)
which implies that the IMF prefers conditional lending iﬀ
L(N(B,P),B,P) ≥ L(N(B,P(A,B)),B,P(A,B))
Using Lemma 3, the IMF prefers conditional lending iﬀ P ≥ P(A,B).





















It will suﬃce to show that this is true for A = Pn. Using (A.1) and substituting we obtain:
2Bn
√
n2 − 3 < 2Bn
2
w h i c hi sa l w a y st r u ef o rn ≥ 2.
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Figure 2: Selected indicators and number of conditions in IMF programs 
 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
EFF SBA SAF ESAF PRGF  all
Number of programs 27 129 3 66 73  298
Avg. number of quarters  9 5 7 10 10  8,2
Total
Number of conditions 3142 7448 108 5527 5956  22181
Performance criteria  2225 5309 67 3171 3737  14509
Prior actions  453 792 0 581 689  2515
Structural benchmarks 464 1347 41 1775 1530  5157
Average
Number of conditions 13 12 5 8 8  9
Performance criteria  9 8 3 5 5  6
Prior actions  2 1 0 1 1  1
Structural benchmarks 2 2 2 3 2  2
Number of areas covered by conditionality
Total 10 9 9 13 11  10
Performance criteria  6 6 6 10 8  7
Prior actions  3 2 0 2 3  2
Structural benchmarks 4 3 4 6 5  4
Note: "Average" indicates the average number of conditions per quarter a program is in effect.Table 2: Sources and Definitions 
 Variables  Definition  Source 
ECONOMIC      
  Log of per capita income  GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)  WDI, WB (2008) 
  GDP growth   GDP growth (annual %)  WDI, WB (2008) 
  Rate of inflation  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)  WDI, WB (2008) 
  International reserves (to imports)  Total reserves in months of imports  WDI, WB (2008) 
  Current account balance  Current account balance (% of GDP)  WDI, WB (2008) 
  Domestic (fixed) investments  Gross capital formation (% of GDP)  WDI, WB (2008) 
  Growth of government consumption  Government  consumption expenditure (annual % growth)  WDI, WB (2008) 
  Total debt service (to exports)  Total debt service to exports  WDI, WB (2008) 
  Total external debt (to GDP)  Total external debt (% of GDP)  WDI, WB (2008) 
POLITICAL      
  Voting in line with the US in the UNGA  Percentage of votes within a year inline with the US  Based on Voeten (2004) 
  Temporary member of the UN Security Council  Dummy for temporary UNSC membership  Dreher et al. (2006, 2009) 
BIAS      
Institutional Capacity and Complexity   
  Government stability  Government Stability, annual averages  ICRG (1984-2005) 
  Corruption  Corruption, annual averages  ICRG (1984-2005) 
  Law and order  Law and Order, annual averages  ICRG (1984-2005) 
  Investment profile  Investment Profile, annual averages  ICRG (1984-2005) 
  Bureaucracy quality   Bureaucracy Quality, annual averages   
  Social conditions  Socioeconomic Conditions, annual averages  ICRG (1984-2005) 
  Ethnic tension  Ethnic Tensions, annual averages   ICRG (1984-2005) 
  Strength of special interests  Share  of  seats  in  the parliament held by “special interests” 
parties (religious, nationalistic, regional, rural)  
Database of Political 
Institutions, WB 
  Democracy  Polity2 score taken from the Polity IV dataset  Marshall and Jaggers 
Externalities      
  Economic globalization  Actual flows and restrictions both on finance and trade  Dreher (2006) 
  Overall globalization index  Overall globalization index  Dreher (2006) 
  Trade  Exports plus imports (% of GDP)  WDI, WB (2008) 
  Financial globalization  First  principal  component of the existence of multiple 
exchange rates, restrictions on current and/or capital account 
transactions, requirement of the surrender of export proceeds 
Chinn and Ito (2007)  Variables  Definition  Source 
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE    
Transparency      
  Democracy  Polity2 score taken from the Polity IV dataset  Marshall and Jaggers 
  Press freedom  Freedom of the press index  Freedom House (2006) 
  Missing data  Share in 250 Economics data series for which no data reported  WDI, WB (2008) 
Complexity      
  Social conditions/ Ethnic tension  Annual averages  ICRG (1984-2005) 
IMF KNOWLEDGE    
Government officials     
  Bureaucracy quality  Bureaucracy Quality, annual averages  ICRG (1984-2005) 
  Education  School enrolment, primary (% net)   WDI, WB (2008) 
    School enrolment, secondary (% net)  WDI, WB (2008) 
    School enrolment, tertiary (% gross)  WDI, WB (2008) 
Externalities  See above     Table 3: Number of IMF Conditions, GLS, 1992-2005 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Government Stability 3.888 3.343
(4.60)*** (4.01)***
Law and Order -7.010 -8.357
(4.16)*** (4.57)***
Bureaucratic Quality -2.547 -0.251
(2.09)** (0.22)




Press Freedom 3.747 6.945
(0.86) (1.57)
Trade (percent of GDP) -0.174 0.295
(1.16) (2.06)**
Lack of Transparency -209.828 -287.039
(8.71)*** (12.46)***
Number of Quarters 6.097 6.345 6.672
(10.69)*** (18.75)*** (17.84)***
(log) GDP p.c. -58.483 -127.208
(3.86)*** (11.17)***
GDP growth -0.563 -0.664
(2.18)** (1.51)
Current Account Balance (percent of GDP) -0.428 -0.689
(2.77)*** (3.06)***




UNSC member -41.085 -19.766
(4.67)*** (1.76)*
UNGA voting -37.724 -77.009
(1.97)** (3.31)***
Number of observations 170 219 142
Number of countries 55 66 46  
 
Notes: Estimation is with GLS fixed effects and correction for AR(1) autocorrelation within panels 
and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across countries; absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 Table 4: Areas covered by IMF Conditions, GLS, 1992-2005 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Government Stability 0.275 0.342
(6.49)*** (5.81)***
Law and Order -0.342 -0.138
(5.84)*** (1.69)*
Bureaucratic Quality -0.245 -0.085
(5.87)*** (1.48)




Press Freedom 0.267 0.257
(1.57) (1.08)
Trade (percent of GDP) 0.011 0.033
(1.52) (4.06)***
Lack of Transparency -4.972 -5.284
(4.05)*** (2.79)***
Number of Quarters 0.210 0.155 0.205
(9.72)*** (8.07)*** (7.60)***
(log) GDP p.c. -1.856 -6.796
(2.22)** (6.46)***
GDP growth 0.051 0.072
(3.76)*** (3.32)***
Current Account Balance (percent of GDP) -0.042 -0.059
(4.22)*** (2.63)***




UNSC member -1.981 -0.340
(13.02)*** (1.62)
UNGA voting -1.818 -2.345
(1.72)* (1.55)
Number of observations 170 219 142
Number of countries 55 66 46  
 
Notes: Estimation is with GLS fixed effects and correction for AR(1) autocorrelation within panels 
and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity across countries; absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 Appendix: Descriptive Statistics (Estimation sample of column 3, Table 1) 
 
Variable Min Max Mean St.Dev.
Number of Conditions 14.00 349.00 74.47 49.68
Areas covered by Conditions 4.00 16.00 9.78 2.90
Number of Quarters 3.00 18.00 9.77 4.30
Log of per capita income 4.82 9.01 7.00 1.07
GDP growth -11.03 16.73 3.21 4.40
Rate of inflation -0.01 0.91 0.15 0.16
International reserves (to imports) 0.04 11.08 3.64 2.33
Current account balance -44.84 19.75 -2.65 7.26
Domestic (fixed) investments 8.12 34.67 20.16 5.24
Growth of government consumption -32.91 46.34 2.12 10.77
Voting in line with the U.S. in the UNGA 0.16 0.63 0.37 0.11
Temporary member of the UN Security Council 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22
Government stability 3.67 12.00 7.86 1.97
Corruption 2.00 10.00 5.60 1.86
Law and order 2.00 12.00 6.64 2.12
Investment profile 2.00 11.50 6.86 2.14
Bureaucracy quality 3.00 10.63 5.60 2.10
Social conditions 1.33 8.08 4.69 1.39
Ethnic tension 2.00 12.00 8.15 2.53
Strength of special interests 0.00 0.95 0.08 0.19
Democracy -7.00 10.00 4.54 5.12
Economic globalization 26.14 89.01 50.95 13.35
Overall globalization index 22.95 75.32 47.73 10.58
Trade 14.73 203.84 72.88 36.88
Financial globalization -1.80 2.54 0.27 1.46
Press freedom 0.00 3.00 2.02 0.68
Missing data 0.01 0.46 0.13 0.09
Education 27.17 99.66 84.27 15.74  